The Imperatives of Early Critical Theory and the Zuma-fication of the South African society

C. Engelbrecht

2016

Abstract

Aspects of Critical Theory are of value when unpacking Zuma-fication as a process and behaviour imbedded in fraudulent and corrupt South Africa political culture. Zuma-fication compromised a society that exposed its president, its ruling party and the government at large. Fraud and corruption in the ANC-led government have a rich history of its own that can be traced back to its exile-years. The post-1994 governing process and functionaries irrationally regressed into neo-domination and discrimination characterised by fraught reasoning and a morality that brought about a two-decade old democracy that society at large is now rejecting. Since 'crime pays' in the world of the illegal economy, mega-fraud and corruption are crimes against humanity.

Key words: Horkheimer, Critical Theory, Zuma, fraud and corruption, false consciousness, reason, domination, crimes against humanity, South African history.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to develop a framework for analysis about how president Jacob Zuma's berm in office continues to infiltrate and subject South African society through a process of capturing state institutions. He does so to further his own selfish material and political interests by expanding an inherent characteristic of the ANC that predates the 1980s – the drive for acquiring power.

The result is a self-inflicted process of antagonism that has now become the enemy of the open and democratic society of South Africa. The current groundswell of civic opposition against president Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC), highlights at least two truisms: history is no longer only made or written by the victors, and secondly, he can no longer claim unchallenged legitimacy of presidential authority (Engelbrecht 2013a: 4, 8). In fact, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) does

not recognize Zuma as president of the country and regularly walk out of parliamentary and other meetings (public or private) when Zuma takes to the podium to deliver a speech.

Whereas Marx wrote (in 1848) about the spectre of communism that was haunting Europe (Marx and Engels 2002: 218), for more than two decades now, a spectre is currently haunting South Africa – the spectre of institutionalised fraud, endemic corruption (Nhlabathi 2016) and state capture by functionaries in state organs that make them important players in the illegal economy.

It has been widely publicised (as far back as the mid-1990s), that president Zuma had "a generally corrupt relationship"; a "mutually beneficial symbiosis"; or "an overall corrupt relationship" in respect of involvement with the so-called Arms Deal suppliers (*The Star* 2006; Engelbrecht 2013b). Secondly, on 3 March 2016 the Constitutional Court (Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng) ruled that: 'The President thus *failed to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land* [emphasis added]. This failure is manifest from the substantial disregard for the remedial action taken against him by the Public Protector in terms of her constitutional powers' (Masondo 2016) and that he should pay back some of the R256 million state money that he used to pay for upgrades to his private residence, at Nkhandla in KwaZulu-Natal. Thirdly, in a landmark ruling, a full bench of the North Gauteng High Court ruled at about mid-day on 2 November 2016, that former Public Protector Adv. Thuli N. Madonsela's ***State of Capture Report* (No: 6 of 2016/17). *Report on an investigation into alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other state functionaries relating into alleged and improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family's businesses***, be released publically by the office of the new Public Protector, Adv. Busisiwe Mkhwebane, by no later than 17:00 on 2 November 2016. This was duly done.

According to Adorno and Horkheimer (2011: 2) the function of theory 'is to reflect reality' in pursuance of 'the good life' (Engelbrecht 2012: 1) for all citizens. But intellectual climates are constantly changing (Engelbrecht 2013c: 2) and theories do not outlive their applicability. They are ultimately replaced by newer ones because their subject matter follows the life-cycle of humans. In other words, regardless of their mere temporal 'contributions', all theories are eventually superseded by new ones because 'they face an "authority" crisis' (Engelbrecht 2012: 3) when they can no longer withstand criticism of what they intended to achieve in the first place. In addition, modern technology has placed added strain on the longevity of theory because its relative authoritativeness in today's democratic life is easily accessible and tested by the civil body politic in the public domain. Traditional theory and political practice can therefore be fiercely debated on an instantaneous and global scale through the sheer volume, speed and everywhereness of information (Engelbrecht 2014a: 1). Such open societies and its enemies (Popper 2008) are then exposed because there is no place to hide (Horkheimer 1978: 82). In addition, the language which such public debates use, cuts through scientific difficulties with the help all social media platforms. This makes communicative action in the

public domain seamless. The result is that modern-day theory is no longer an abstract without evidence and its endurance does not conform to the once popular *longue durée* methodologies along cyclical conceptions of history. Therefore, a theory about Zuma-fication needs to be imbedded in fact.

2. Imperatives of early Critical Theory: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno

For the above reasons, the imperatives of early Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School are deemed suitable and applicable as a framework for analysis to explain the process of Zuma-fication in South Africa. In other words, Critical Theory still has considerable influence over post-structuralist political and sociological thought regarding social and cultural transformation (Jacobson and Jacobson in Horkheimer 2007: 1) of societies towards 'real democracy' where all forms of discrimination and domination be eradicated in an emancipated society that is just, rational and humane (Engelbrecht 2013d: 4).

From its beginning (1920), early Critical Theory assisted to expose a sense of deep cultural pessimism (Hamilton in Bottomore 1984: 7) that Horkheimer and Adorno described in post-World War I German society – a theme that has today become increasingly common in the comments of many South Africans on various social media platforms today. South Africans show growing disillusionment with post-apartheid South African democratic life. The essence of their unhappiness is complex: the society that they have today is not what they fought for pre-1994 and it is not what they were promised thereafter by the ANC. Instead, South African has fallen back into a new state of 'barbarism' of widespread fraud and corruption. For instance, in an open letter in November 2016 to president Zuma on Twitter, the following sentiments were expressed: 'Dear President Zuma: We are exhausted. No words could describe the pain and suffering the average South African has endured [because of] you' (*News24*, 2016a). This is very similar to Horkheimer's view about the 'solidarity of all human life in relation to universal surplus suffering' (Engelbrecht 2014b: 5). Of course, in both instances suffering goes further than what Horkheimer wrote about as merely not being able to afford e.g. medicine, or not having enough money to make money, or people living in exploited colonies around the world (Engelbrecht 2014c: 6–7, 10).

Two themes in Horkheimer and Adorno's formulation of Critical Theory are important for this study. Firstly, that exploitive capitalist (Engelbrecht 2015: 5) 'society is not just based on the domination of nature in the narrow sense … [but] … is equally based on the domination of human beings by other human beings' (Horkheimer 1993: 316). Such society is an unjust one and they equated injustice with barbarism (Engelbrecht 2014c: 12). Secondly, they wanted to explain 'why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism' (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: xiv). Both themes are important because in the South African context the debate in the public domain is that after 20 years of ANC rule, all forms of domination and discrimination have not been eradicated from the state institutions but in fact has simply been replaced

by new forms of institutionalized exploitation and domination. In fact, public opinion is that government has done and achieved little to bring about the society that the ANC 'sold' to the electorate before and since 1994.

As early as 22 August 1918, Horkheimer wrote about the value of 'practical philosophy' (Horkheimer 2007: 10) and again three years later on 30 November 1921 that he had 'little desire to string together […] an enormous number of extraneous ideas, indifferent laws, and lifeless facts' (Horkheimer 2007: 21–22). It is clear that from the beginning early Critical Theory was for Horkheimer and Adorno the framework in which an empirical and historically founded interdisciplinary research program would overcome some shortcomings of earlier Marxist theories of historical and social development. In the mid-1920s Horkheimer wrote that the 'less stable necessary ideologies are, the more cruel the methods by which they are protected' (Horkheimer 1978: 17). For instance, 'There is not only the general, systematically engineered brainwashing and death to deter reason from attacking the key conceptual techniques of domination' (Horkheimer 1978: 17) to control civic society. Even the technological and other advances of the early 20th century (Engelbrecht 2014c) were deemed the foundations of human suffering because of their roots in capitalist exploitation.

Horkheimer described 'those on top in this [read capitalist/bourgeois] society as horrible' and often, although using different terms, as 'barren intellectuals' (Horkheimer 1978: 19; 21; 25; 43). The contradiction is therefore that the so-called advances brought about by the capitalist system, are in fact 'organised exploitation on a world-wide scale. In addition, its preservation created boundless suffering' (Horkheimer 1978: 28) by 'the real enemy of a system based on exploitation and misery' of others (Horheimer 1978: 33). Any belief in and perpetuation of such materialist system of production suffers from a false consciousness and pursuance of false needs. It is simply ideology and myth to think that anything good and humane can come out of it.

Critical Theory highlights 'the just ordering of life' (Horkheimer 1993: 314) because 'society is not just based on the domination of nature in the narrow sense … [but] … is equally based on the domination of human beings by other human beings' (Horkheimer 1993: 316). Part of one's consciousness is imbedded in our experiences of the transformative ordering of society that stem from the situational concept of ideology that is joined to the political intention of such particular concept. For that reason it is not possible to just demote consciousness into oblivion (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 3). Even when Horkheimer worked in his father's factories at the young age of 15 (because he was destined to take over the family businesses one day), he was very consciousness of the working conditions of the workers and sympathised with them. But the class-based concept of ideology is in reality a false consciousness. The result is a lack of correspondence with real life. It conceals the actual meaning of enlightened human conduct which gives a false sense of common life and does not advance the freeing of humans from all forms of domination. Instead, the *total* concept of ideology leaves behind theories of political opponents' political theory and rather concentrates on enlightened human consciousness. It is the light in the tunnel that shines on the undoing of human over others and

nature. In so-doing one finds a 'philosophical interpretation of the vicissitudes of human fate' (Horkheimer 1993: 1) that are subjected to power relations the ruling elite wields around. For Fichte, philosophy advances itself in self-reflection; for Hegel it is self-consciousness. Both are rooted in history since nothing in history has ever been accomplished without the active interest of those concerned in it. As a result, through *praxis*, consideration is given to the theoretical *and* practical relationships of individuals in and between societies. Jürgen Habermas wrote that Critical Theory develops the idea of a theory of society with practical intent (Habermas 1974: 1) in order to stay connected with real life. Close connection with real life enables us then to eradicate all forms of discrimination and domination. Such closeness with conjoins history with psychology and morality (Horkheimer 1993: 15).

The determination whether human actions are good or evil brings important decisions into the realm of clear consciousness and moral evaluation of instinctual and habitual behaviour in ever-increasing multi-cultural open societies. By merely following instinct or habit and behaviour in an individually typical manner, does not ensure socially acceptable and historically significant conduct based on rationally founded morality. Both tenets are under pressure in current South Africa. Horkheimer argued that 'the modern problem of morality in its essentials has its roots in the bourgeois order' (Horkheimer 1993: 18). It is true that humans produce objects that others need and therefore the requirements of a community as a whole are dependent on, but not separate from, an individual's own welfare and moral behaviour. Thus: the economic advantage of production is not an end in itself for the individual, but rather a means to the material common good for all in society.

A prerequisite for such ordering of society is the rational connection between free competition and morality. When senseless suffering (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 21) becomes the result, the irrationality of behaviour affects the welfare and misery of others in society. It plays itself out 'as a conflict in the inner life of its subjects' (Horkheimer 1993: 20) because of the false consciousness that materialism instils. But the bourgeoisie turns its back on the considerations of moral laws because they do not seriously pursue them. They have lost their own power to promote the interests of society at large and therefore obscure the potentialities of all people useful to civic community. Indeed, they have captured them. This 'capture' is best exposed when someone acquires goods or services with a false promise (Horkheimer 1993: 23) to pay, or worse, not paying. The ultimate is of course fraud and corruption. When fraud and corruption set in, the morality of the relationship between the parties is broken since the selfish will of one, disrespects the value of other individuals. In other words, the line of being true to oneself has been blurred and then crossed into the realm of self-interest. This then reflects the disparity between the relations of material ownership in which there can no longer be any general interest in alleged 'good intensions'. In so-doing, the future of civic society has been compromised – at least in terms of equality before, and access to, the law. But it is impossible to have equality before and access to the law because the ideology that reflects the material base of human relations, dictates that market values determine human relations. Under such conditions materialist

property relations are progress-limiting by nature (Horkheimer 1978: 29–30; 36) for the benefit of the elite at the expense of the poor.

Horkheimer argued that there is an inescapable illogical contradiction imbedded in reason. On the one hand, reasonable things, for the average man, include the freedom to 'decide what is useful to him' (Horkheimer 2004: 3). This resonates well with his view that 'for something to be true means that it is so constituted that everyone must acknowledge it' (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 6). Therefore, subjective reason as an instrument of human actions in society is supposed to direct human preferences according to what is reasonable. Instead, reason has disbanded its own rationality (Horkheimer 2004) because of the contradiction between self-interest and duty. On the one hand, one thing is being promised but in reality another is meant or acted on. This ideological mass manipulation (Horkheimer 2004: 17; 45) of language makes language a means to an end, being incapable of delivering on the ultimate values of life as formulated in line with what is reasonable, just and enlightened. Because of the 'tension between the moral postulate and social reality' (Horkheimer 2004: 27), the outcome is the relative depravation of large parts of society. This means the domination of man by man and the perpetuation and rationalization of adjusted and egotistically self-preservation of a system that talks about equality, rule of law, non-racialism etc. but in which institutionalized and different degrees of freedom that were compromised (Horkheimer 2004: 67; 69), are at the centre of every-day life.

But what, in a nutshell, is the essence of such society for the average man in the street? From as early as Horkheimer's late teenage writings, his answer was: a life of misery and shared suffering (Horkheimer1978: 18) under domination by those on top of society – 'the ruling clique' (Horkheimer 1978: 55; Engelbrecht 2015: 4). Science, technology and language are no less tools in the hands of those 'who tell[…] the truth in simple terms' (Horkheimer 1978: 17) – the 'barren intellectuals' (Horkheimer 1978: 25). Therefore, in order to understand such society, one needs to consider that Horkheimer and Adorno set out 'to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism' (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: xiv). In summary: for Horkheimer and Adorno *enlightenment* meant a life free from all forms of fear (Engelbrecht 2014d: 1) emancipated (Engelbrecht 2012: 5) from domination. If not, suffering remains eternal (Engelbrecht 2014b) and universal (Engelbrecht 2015: 5) with the possibility to regress into a previous state of barbarism remains omnipresent. In an enlightened society however, all forms of work is done to improve human lot, but since we do not live in enlightened times and circumstances, work is suffering instead of being a tool to bring about happiness to human life. Under Zuma-fication 'work' took on a whole new meaning. It remains futile human effort and certainly not in line with pre-1994 election promises. One example will suffice: today 47% of South Africans receive wages less than the proposed R3 500 minimum living wage.

---

3. Zuma-fication as *praxis*

Etymologically, the suffix '-ification' originally comes from the Latin *-ficātiō* and then into Old French *-ification* that is a variant of *-fy* in Middle English. It forms nouns of action from verbs e.g. *modification* (noun) from *modify* (verb). Seen in this way, '-ification' contains a sense of 'becoming' something and over time becomes the acceptance as normal, standard behaviour, or the state of things as matter of fact.

The concept 'Zuma-fication' for our purposes herein refers to a Zuma-specific process and behaviour with the intent of solving problems towards achieving an end state as he perceives them – mostly in conflict with the Constitution and rule of law (Van Onselen 2014: 51). The things, he says, are often conflicted with official party thinking, e.g. he sees himself as above the party and the party as above the country (*Sapa* 2014; Quintall 2015). This is in line with what Adorno and Horkheimer (2011: 4) said that the party then ceases to exist. Nevertheless, support for the hearts and minds of subordinates are recruited through a participative web of networks. What does not conform to this becomes delegitimized as the Other and is seen and treated as unacceptable. And if need be, president Zuma simply moves officials around to best serve his interests. When studying post-World War I German society, Horkheimer and Adorno came to the conclusion that a relapse into previous forms of barbarism might happen again (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 23). This is also true in South Africa. Post-1994 regression into 'barbarism' after the Arms Deal, manifested itself in numerous crises involving fraud and corruption where false consciousness and misplaced reason account for a cultural decline that became rooted in new forms of domination and discrimination. This is nothing new under ANC governance.

The process of Zuma-fication and related behaviour is communicated through his varied use of language in expressions that are considered equal but are embedded in several different and conflicting frameworks. This phenomenon employs substitution of what is, by identifying and use of terms and concepts that attempts to consolidate. It aims to bring together in order so that it becomes a single unit towards a credible state or desired condition. It is a coalition of combining, mergers that turn feuding constituents into a unified group where lines of understanding and interpretation are blurred for the greater good of the argument. At the centre of saying one thing but actually meaning another, is a networking phenomenon that enhances interactivity between contradictions to achieve a process of maintaining or becoming a *status quo* of being alike to correspondence theory. For instance, president Zuma has been described as a 'demagogue who plays different tunes to different audiences and who engenders the support of demagogues in turn' (Van Onselen 2014: xi). Typically, both the president and ANC would publically denounce corruption and pronounce to actively root it out, but rhetoric is characteristic of hypocritical behaviour that continues to perpetuate it by turning a blind eye to it or not act on it. Zuma-fication does not strive for rational coherency nor is it achieved. In such world, Zuma-fication is the legitimizing of disconnected beliefs and meta-legal actions. Its

expansion is a form of 'social creeping' trough his use of language and off-the-cuff remarks that can best be summarized as 'word games', 'linguistic gymnastics', 'rhetorical liability' and a 'typical Zuma statement in response to difficult question [that] will say everything and nothing' (Van Onselen 2014: xiv, xv).

Thus, the politics of patronage does not begin and end with Zuma's alleged violation of the Executive Ethics Code (Madonsela 2016: 343–347). Instead, it features at all levels of government. It has been argued that since the ANC has lost its moral compass and has therefore given up its own values, that there is nothing to wrong with protecting fraud-engineers and president Zuma's symbiotic relationship with the ANC. This has been clearly exposed in the vote of no confidence debate on 10 November 2016. In effect, the president has been 'captured' by the ANC that does not want to recall him but instead to use him as a 'tool' to keep the party unified. In so-doing, the ANC has closed the proverbial *kraal*. The consequence of such strategy is that the ANC's protection of the president does so at its own expense. Public requests by serving ANC MPs for president Zuma to do the right thing and resign, testifies to their dissatisfaction with him but also with factionalism in the party and amongst the alliance partners. In this process the party and president alienate themselves from the electorate, other serving party members, civic society, organized business community, veterans and church groupings. The ANC is thus a party deeply divided – something that has been publically admitted by ANC national executive committee members and lower cadres alike. In fact Gwede Mantashe has started on a roadshow of political education to unify the party form the bottom up. He publically admitted to party divisions, and in public that 'enough is enough' of corruption. Surprisingly on 18 November 2016 in the Pietermaritzburg City Hall at a gathering intended to invigorate the party's 'political consciousness', president Zuma said that he would never have thought that ANC cadres would hate one another as never before (Khoza 2016). But about four days earlier, a columnist wrote: 'We are united in our hatred of him [Zuma]' (*News24* 2016). On 18 November 2016, national spokesperson of the ANC, Zizi Kodwa, bemoaned Cosatu affiliate, National Health and Allied Workers Union's (Nehawu) call earlier for the president to resign (Herman 2016). Stated differently, president Zuma's Zuma-fication has unleashed a *gatvol* (fed up) factor in society that goes at the heart of standing up against fraud, corruption, his relative involvement therein and the closing of the *kraal* by his handpicked collaborators. Despite growing calls on Zuma from civil society movement Save SA, Zuma repeated on 19 November at a rally to trump up support in KwaDukuza, KwaZulu-Natal, 'I am not leaving' (Olifant 2016a: 4).

In this instance, the theory of attempting to expose an innate defect of the mind that leads president Zuma to always in the first instance, express an idea in the most awkward possible form, needs to deal with constant contradictions. Inevitably, it is followed up by cryptic elaboration as matter-of-fact that complicates the original outline. In this lies its inherent strength of convincing an audience but are also simultaneously roots for self-destruction. President Zuma's subjective delight and self-belief in such populist communication and language uses, show clearly little feeling or regard for rational

discourse. This seems contradictory to Horkheimer's early view the 'very nature of language is to create ties, to establish community' (Horkheimer 1978: 75) of understanding. The manner in which president Zuma uses language is indispensable in his struggle for political survival. Because of the contradictions in his speeches they create the 'the illusion of a community that does not exist' (Horkheimer 1978: 75). Instead of linking logical units, it splits communities into contested spaces. For Horkheimer, this meant an 'outdated social order that has gone bad' (Horkheimer 1978: 29).

In a sense the society has gone so bad that president Zuma seems not to mind to insult sections thereof. For instance, the term 'cleaver blacks' was coined in 2013 when president Zuma insulted urban blacks 'who become too cleaver', when he said: 'they become the most eloquent in criticising themselves about their own traditions and everything' (Stone 2016a). It is this educated black youth, sometimes referred to as the so-called 'born free's' who also played an important role in the #ZumaMustFall and #FeesMustFall campaigns during 2015 and 2016. On 19 November Zuma also insulted cadre members when he maintained that those who speak out in public against him are 'puppets of the enemy' (Tandwa 2016) – the very same people from who he is seeking support during his roadshow speeches in November 2016. Typical of his politicking tactics is to visit his geographical grassroots support bases every time he needs to reconfirm his popularity and ongoing controversial behavioural acts. An integral part of Zuma-fication is then to play the innocent victim card and blaming is enemies in his efforts to solicit support. And still, a day before president Zuma and NEC members were to meet with about 101 ANC veterans at their request, to address their concerns about his leadership, his insulted them by intimating that they do not know how the ANC works. This shows a few things: first the veterans can at best make moral arguments and call on his consciousness to do the right thing and resign. Secondly, this is assuming that he would listen to his consciousness and resign. Thirdly, there seems little prospect for this because the president made it clear he is going nowhere, sending a clear message to the veterans in anticipation of his meeting with them on 21 November 2016. Lastly, the same holds true with his stance towards the Save SA campaign calling upon him to resign. Instead, and arrogantly he asked: 'Save South Africa! From What?'

Zuma-fication does however appear to be robust enough of living up to the occasion *en route* the path of this his struggle for continued political existence. But this is only partially true because calm, reasoned and unrhetorical contemplation deconstructs populist inconsistent and often simple but wrong logic. If one considers that Zuma has been a 'long-time sufferer at the hands of lawyers' (Van Onselen 2014: 53), the following illogic is pertinent: president Zuma currently spends a vast amount of time in embroiled legal battles – some argue that he is so busy with fighting legal battles that he does not do his job – the job of managing the country. On 17 November 2016, he complained that the country is in effect ruled by the courts. This simple view of a rather complex situation beams with illogic half-truths. The reality is that extra-legal happenings do not seek him out, making him an innocent victim – he commits extra-legal actions in the first place. He then justifies his behaviour in

populist manner. Horkheimer warned against this when he wrote: ‘Woe to the man who tells the truth in simple terms’ (Horkheimer 1978: 17). This is proven to be inconsistent with party views because conflicting utterances by ANC cadres. For instance, on 5 November 2016 president Zuma confidently said that he is not afraid to go to jail (Madibogo 2016) but then on Thursday 10 November 2016, in a caucus meeting before a vote of no confidence in president Zuma in parliament, ‘[h]e told the caucus that he wanted to clarify the statement that he was not afraid to go to jail in context’ (Makinana *et al.*, 2016). In other words, there is a naïve belief that seemingly simple half-truths would not cause discomfort for members of his audience who rather deals with the facts of the matter, only to be corrected later. Yet, this enthusiasm and almost childlike sense of belief in the amazing contrivances of the interrelations of the complexities of the world and the South African society, almost always became desiccated even while he was engaged in giving them a purely self-believed explanation. This is supported by a ritualistic form of charm through slow clumsy dance movements that unduly masks the brutality of materialist analysis that exposed the soulless nature of political content. Unintentionally such behaviour, usually in front of public audiences, becomes the least revolutionary and least intellectually convincing pieces of intellectual pronouncements that do not deliver the desired outcomes. To many citizens this is an appalling way of looking at civil society and state instruments. Recipients argue that their intellect has been ‘dumbing-down’ through deliberate oversimplification of contents and context. Figuratively speaking, it becomes a walk in a tropical forest with a sense of intoxicated wonder of the panorama of the Zuma-way of world-making but that has arrived at a state of scarcely any realistic hope to recapture the so-called era of ANC apparent moral high-ground for the often uttered ‘all-South-Africans-promise’.

The relative cosy relationship (Madonsela 2016: 345) with state institutions and the potential they hold for exploitation for self-enrichment by the lover and collector of what belongs to others, is nothing more than unsympathetic disrespect and disgraceful regard of all South Africans’ material conditions. This is mirrored by the social media that gives a sense of openness into practises of state individuals and organs rather than being locked up in a museum. They are robustly placed on a public dissecting table for public discourse with a sensitivity of civic relations in an environment where ‘democracy is at work’ or ‘not at work’, that means different things for president Zuma than for the body politic at large.

The problem for president Zuma with such anti-intellectual stances is that inherent in democracy is the imperative that the will of the people rules, not what is imposed on and for them by their political elite. In this lie the double-edged opportunities and threats for democracy: the disillusionment with democracy, say from the bottom up, becomes the driver to act against state imposers and impostors of relative deprivation. On the other hand, president Zuma and the ANC’s intolerance of and disillusionment with democracy are the antithesis of the very same form of state political philosophy which they claim was the basis for fighting apartheid in the first place. It has a rhetorical insensitivity of certain relations that are at the same time a disregard for relations of subjects in a political

environment which was considerably lost in the ensuing years as the state of capture and institutional fraud became prolific and professional. No sphere of life is spared – human and non-human life is both subjected. It is prolific in the sense that Zuma-fication is a state functionaries-wide reality and being professional in that corrupt activities are perpetrated by professional public servants in the daily execution of what were to be their professional duties of serving the state and citizenry. Thus, the politics of patronage and a society has gone bad (Horkheimer 1978: 29). Makhlanya (2016) described it as humanity that has gone into rewind.

It is argued here that president Zuma displays a naïve enthusiasm of his descriptions through carelessly composed sentences with a childlike sense and exposition of the interrelatedness of the world as he perceives it to be. It is an appalling way of understanding the world with amazing contrivances of the so-called democratic revolution of the ANC. His lack of sensitivity about these things were essentially lost in the dichotomous belief that under his rein all South Africans benefit from democratic rule, whilst in fact, it does not exist. The apparent mutation of a better material life for all, especially the poor, is based on explanations that fit fiction rather than fact. He is basically never in a position to demonstrate conclusively that the ANC rule has anything to do with intense sensitivity and enlightened South African society (Engelbrecht 2014d). There is an argument to be made out about a soulless and intoxicated inert desire to quickly seize upon his critics of state crises. Since ministers serve at the pleasure of the president, their appointments to and removals from office are regular occurrences – so are the awards of state contracts tenderpreneurship. In other words the value of an individual or group of individuals are determined by their ability or not to contribute to the process of Zuma-fication.

President Zuma has misread three great intellectual developments over time: first, the rediscovery of philosophical truths (Horkheimer 1978: 197–198) in every-day South African life by what is disdainly referred to as ‘cleaver Blacks’; secondly, the progress of science and technological developments (Horkheimer 1972: 3–9) in the public domain via social media; lastly, the rethinking of the origin of man and his place in the natural world in the struggle for equal existence before the law (Horkheimer 2004: 87–109). The polemical impact of his *praxis* could be buffered only for so long, in fact, it has haunted him from before his first term in office. It is (was) the inability to provide a rational synthesis of his set(s) of believes that paved the way for ‘societal creeping’ (Engelbrecht: Colonization: 4) of the expanding Zuma-fication of and into South African society. The result is a mutation of illogical (Coetzee 2014) and unfounded hypothesis regardless of his personal delight in them. For instance, in response to questions in the National Assembly on 13 September 2012, Zuma said: ‘Sorry, we have more right here because we are the majority. You have fewer rights because you are in the minority. Absolutely, that’s how democracy works’ (Van Onselen 2014: 60). Two points to consider: firstly, this is discriminatory and secondly, the Constitution protects minority rights just as much as it does for the majority.

The arguments put forward are typical of compromises that are consciously created as solutions or explanations to the problems of a traditional dogmatic outlook. It mirrors control over the Zuma-world, natural and non-natural alike that has become impossible to sustain in an unintellectual reasoning. It borders on selective selection of reading and understanding the civic life in South Africa. The result is a morally objectionable disreputable structure of human feelings. Undoubtedly he has done much to popularize such belief system that lacks a balanced historical sense. For instance, president Zuma's continued anti-apartheid criticism as examples of justification of state-underperformance, are typical of excuses more than two decades into the new 'democracy'. Instead, it went the opposite way away from enlightenment – away from providing an assurance that man and nature are linked for the common good. This portrays a lack of sensitivity for philosophical connects between contemplative life, or lover of power and richness (Lobkowicz 1967: 4). It undermines the notion of equality in the reality of a superintending power to subject. In this, there is no conception of a whole series of cataclysmic adjustments that took place in our society that speeds up the extinction of generally acceptable civic values. Rather, the interpretation and belief was Zuma's repeat of a 2008 view that the ANC will rule until Jesus Christ comes back' (Zuma 2014; Tankwa 2016a). Similarly, of Zuma's prediction that the ANC would attract 70+% electoral support in the Aug 2016 municipal elections and that Nkandla ward would be won by the ANC, has no regard for the reality that organisms develop organs harmful to itself but useful to others. He has confidence in orthodox beliefs that his theories are un-suspectable and without entertaining anyone's suspicions towards them. In other words, the foundations of his reputation as a president are undermined by his belief in the fixity of processes as he sees them. This reflects a blind support for the lack of theory where facts have disappeared and were superseded by a personalized class of 'facts'. This underrates the idea of evolution of public discourse and the mutability of rational selection of juxtapositions. There thus seems a correlation to what Horkheimer described as '[t]he "importance", the "public interest", "the service in a cause", and the indispensability of their "activity" with which they dress up every step they take. This whole obtrusive set of circumstances, is somewhat reminiscent of the naïve image of the primitive medicine man who makes solemn gestures as he devours the lion's share of the loot, except that this modern magic is infinitely more of a sham' (Horkheimer 1978: 79). In other words, it can be argued that president Zuma's reason is in crisis and has become irrational because it compromises the freedom of his thought processes and the lives of those at the receiving end of his decisions and actions. Since reason is a form of self-preservation there is nothing to preserve for the compromised individual. The president's own individuality is therefore stunted and remains caged in tradition, factionalism and worse, in a 'captured' state. Such 'captured' individual lives between material greed and consciousness within compromised morality – a life of socio-political and economic pessimism.

One such chief objection is the Machiavellian truism that ultimate power corrupts ultimately. The same happens with fraud and corruption: it runs from the top and creeps into all levels of society. The

---

reality is that corruption set in well before the so-called Arms Deal (Engelbrecht 2013b; Southall 2016). The ANC was thus well-placed to sow the seed of corruption before well before 1994. The everyday occurrence of fraud and corruption results in the acquisition of new organs by mature organisms and their inheritance in the next generation (Burrow in Darwin 1976: 28). This point was made as follows: 'Our President has brought shame to our organisation [read ANC] and our country for personal indiscretions and blatant actions of corruption and collusion with forces that do not care about people or our country' (Carolus 2016). But Zuma has no difficulty in demonstrating the immense fertility of interpretations in a manner that is supposed to have precise checks that operate to control 'missing links' that critics seem to have leave out or had not considered. For that reason he introduces subsidiary forms of intellectual selection that portray a struggle between his subjugating convictions and those of his critics. It is clear that second-generation state appointees not only inherited a culture of fraud and corruption, but also perpetuate it.

In this way he discusses the conditions in which fraud and corruption operate freely assuming that his audience finds his versions credible. He anticipates the obvious objections and emphasizes with extreme slowness the process and the time scale in which it is given to function. Not surprising, the process of natural selection is slow in recognising, identifying and taking action on institutionalized corruption. It depends on there being places in the polity of governance which can better be occupied by likeminded corrupt public servants close to the president and him being close to them. In such uncontested spaces, the country is undergoing modifications of some kind from the top downwards an expanding illegal economy. In this process the active natural selection of like-mined individuals will depend on the pool from which the selection takes place. It slowly modifies mutual relations of many others in such group being deployed for the greater 'cause' of self-interest. In this sense the greater amount of life in the world of Zuma-fication can be supported by great diversification of individuals and state structures into which the feeding of habits become an alternative manner of living.

Despite the conduct by the president as a matter-of-fact superior to the electorate, he thinks, it is a natural one. For instance on Saturday 19 November 2016, Zuma was speaking in Mpumalanga during his roadshow thanking ANC volunteers linking 'himself to Jesus saying he too has been betrayed by people close to him' (Tandwa 2016a). However, over a period of more than a decade this has become problematical and he is hampered by the electorate and the rule of law to the extent that he is not really fit to be in charge of either the ANC or government. His implicit belief that here is no good reason why others should be dissatisfied with his actions, indicate that here is something amiss in his superior-subordinate disposition to others. The consequence is that work is compromised – the work of governing. There are at least two reasons for this, firstly, functionaries are either too busy to plot and plan their own fraudulent and corrupt practices, and secondly, a large proportion of the time is taken up by legal processes against them. For people to function well the person in charge must express instinctively that the relationship with other people in his sphere of influence, is appropriate. This is exactly what the does but it is a contrived logic. The fact is that the irrationality of the

relationship is exposed at various levels of society. It is reflected in the outdatedness of society since the president does not understand his own role as a partner in exploitation. Consequently he does not show feelings of guilt. In fact, in the case about the alleged off by a family member to Deputy Minister of Finance, Hon Mr Mcebisi Jonas, Zuma simply askes: 'Where do I come in?' as if he is an innocent victim (Van Onselen 2014: xviii). His sense of freedom is in the dialectical power relations with like-minded people of a different *neo*-elite class. Whilst it is true that there are 'different angles at how we make our worlds' (Engelbrecht 2014d: 2), the president's rise into and struggle for power-relations, is a profound expression of his life and values. Since the totality of life takes place according to rules of life, President Zuma's angle to world-making gives impetus to and is at the centre of the 'rise of a new elite with alternative ethics' (Engelbrecht 2013b: 3) characterised by (at least) fraud and corruption. It has been suggested as crimes against humanity (Engelbrecht 2013b: 5).

The premise of this argument is based on fact but that is at the same time a mystery. The reality is varying offspring of arguments. It is only by such variations occurring and surviving that natural selection can have anything to do with deciding what and when to use an appropriate argumentative stance. Of course President Zuma talks in this vain despite the science of rational logic and the rule of law. His views about the judiciary and the legal profession that deals with cold facts are disturbing. For president Zuma, facts before the law should rather be interpreted subjectively or dealt with in 'the African way'. For instance, according to him corruption is a white man's construct (**Coetzee** 2014). This is in stark contrast to Deputy-president Cyril Ramaphosa's view: 'Good governance means that when we see corruption we must act on it without delay, because delaying actions against corruption bring cancer and make it bigger, and bigger and bigger', he told the Limpopo Economic Summit in Polokwane on 5 November 2016 (Ramaphosa 2016). Similarly, according to President Zuma, those who lose in parliament and then run to the courts, misinterprets democracy. He put this as follows: 'There's no longer any space for democratic debate. The only space there is for court arguments by lawyers. That's not democracy' (Zuma 2016). This ignorance of the laws of the state is profound. After all, the High Court ruled that he failed to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution. He remains convinced that compared with other factors such direct influence of the judiciary and the effects and misuse of state organs are at the bottom of the reproduction of charges against him and the ANC government. For him, such are intermediaries that stand in his way to directly control and influence state organs and functionaries. It is a universally hostile collective, be it white monopoly capital; the USA that conspires against developing countries; International Criminal Court that concentrates of African cases; Euro-centric UN; International Monetary Fund that is responsible for privileged allocation of funds; colonialism that exploited blacks; legacies of apartheid from which only whites benefitted from, and civic society that conspires against him. These beliefs are notoriously and deliberately netted together but result in nonsensical excuses (Coetzee 2014) to hide infidelity and his own supreme materialism. Horkheimer described this as follows: 'A mistrustful person hides behind a theory to excuse their failure to do their duty in a concrete case' (Horkheimer

---

1978: 41). In the case of Zuma-fication, there is no coherent theory to hide behind or build upon, something that Horkheimer was at pains to describe as the eclipse of reason (Horkheimer 2004).

Conclusion

Government, the ANC as ruling party, practically every state owned entity (SOE), but more importantly, President Zuma have been exposed, not only through investigative journalism and court rulings – but more importantly, because of public criticism of serving party members. The ANC has never had a stable ideology and essentially remains an ailing liberation movement struggling for decades to make the transition to a modern political party in a political landscape that has changed dramatically from even before 1994. But since there seems to be little or no understanding for Feuerbach's XI thesis the state has captured itself through being subjected by Zuma-fication and fraud and corruption remain crimes against humanity. As a result neither the party nor its most senior leaders can self-correct. This is consistent with e.g. historical greed for power, or president Zuma's continued strained relationship with rule of law.

This is remarkable since 'within the culture of the African National Congress (ANC) it is implicitly accepted that one does not talk publicly about what happens inside the organisation' (Feinstein 2007: xi). More far reaching is when on Zuma addressed an ANC cadres forum in Pietermartizburg, he said: 'Those are the thieves and I know they are stealing. I'm just watching them. I know them' (Olifant 2016b).The period of Zuma-fication represents one of the most shameful phases of only two decades of 'democracy'. Some critics have traced the rot within the party back to its years in exile (Boraine 2014: 100; Tankwa 2016c). It is therefore not surprising that such culture is fertile ground for Zuma-fication to flourish. That the ANC has lost its moral compass is now a daily comment in the public domain. This has grown to levels grand enough to refer to president Zuma's involvement as the phrase of 'presidential authoritarianism in democracy' of Zuma-fication. In other words: did the Gupta's capture the state and the president, or did president Zuma capture the state for the Gupta's and himself?

Secondly, for two decades now, popular discounted about e.g. service delivery in South Africa (Mc Lennan and Munslow 2009), has been widespread ingrained in the South African psyche. But the 3 August 2016 municipal election results clearly show how the ANC's support has dwindled to its lowest support level ever with geographical support concentration mainly amongst the rural poor. However, examples abound about rural civil resistance in many manifestations. Amongst the educated youth, the #ZumaMustFall and #FeesMustFall campaigns during 2015 and 2016, the issue is that current society does not mirror their pre-1994 aspirations and promises, were widely published.

In the absence of presidential managing of the country, the National Prosecuting Authority is an indispensable part (Kriegler 2016: 11) of the South African judiciary. In addition, the office of the

Public Protector has constitutional legitimacy in making binding decisions and recommendations. It is therefore logic that in the absence of good governance, both institutions have a function to fulfil. It is generally accepted that good governance means the break with corruption, but first, one must recognize corruption. Lobkowicz formulated this as follows: 'it seemed to me that a faithful and objective exposition usually is the best criticism' (Lobkowicz 1967: xiii). We have dealt with this problem in the sense that President Zuma regards corruption as a white man's invention. Such ritualized thinking has lost its purpose, namely as a means to improve people's lives – a view that Horkheimer (1978: 53) expressed as far back as the mid-1920s.

President Zuma's false consciousness, decision-making fundamentals and belief in half-truths are incompatible with clear-sightedness required in the distribution, socialization and restructuring processes about the forces of production. Instead, Zuma-fication runs contrary to civic interests: capital is interested in profits and workers with the liberation of mankind (Horkheimer 1978: 69) from all forms of domination. Perpetrators of fraud and corruption are after this very same money that they criticize in public as generated by capital at the expense of a better life for all. There is a sense of symbiosis between capital and Zuma-fication since the bourgeois morality that works well for them has been captured and now works well in the processes of Zuma-fication instead of for all citizens. One example regarding Zuma's relation with big business will explain the creeping Zuma-fication. At a gala dinner at the Gallagher Convention Centre, Zuma asked the business community to donate handsomely to the ANC. 'I always say to business people, if you support the ANC, you are investing very wisely. If you don't invest in the ANC your business is in danger' (Khoza 2015).

The institutionalised double-talk use of every-day language exposes the moral character of a person that can be infallibly inferred from his answers to certain questions (Horkheimer 1978: 72). This is for instance clear from video footage about Modonsela's interview with President Zuma regarding the *State of Capture Report*. Once the process of Zuma-fication has 'captured' an individual or group of individuals, binding laws no longer exist, and indifference to the moral struggles of the Other and the presupposition of the ideals of equality and justice, has dissipated from his/her true consciousness. For Horkheimer human consciousness drives logical actions (Horkheimer 1978: 34), but for president Zuma, actions form the foundations for consciousness.

Three commentaries about the current state of Zuma-fication's relation to state capture will suffice. State capture cannot easily be eradicated because 'in the late 1990s cadre deployment was adopted as party policy and aimed at inserting party loyalists into civil service. This means the transformation of the state that entails first and foremost extending the power of the national liberation movement over all levels of power: the army, the police bureaucracy, intelligence structures, judiciary, parastatals and agents such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster and the central bank' (Lebone 2016). In an article 'How can we trust Mahlobo? - R2K', Gqirana wrote: 'In the last two years, Mahlobo has preside over a dangerous creep of state security into our politics and public life' (Gqirana 2016a). Secondly, the EFF 'want[s] to warn Zuma to stop using the name of the Presidency to defend his

---

personal interests and unethical conduct', said M. Ndlozi, EFF spokesperson in a statement. He encouraged Madonsela to keep talking about state capture since it is her right Gqirana 2016b). In response 'The Presidency on Friday 12 November 2016 said Madonsela should 'step back' and stop commenting on the report as she has no further role to play in the process, said Presidency spokesperson, B. Ngqulanga'. In most simple terms, Zuma and the ANC remain at loggerheads with the law since they simply do not know their own 'handbook' – the Constitution. Advocate Paul Hoffmann SC, summarized this as a 'dereliction of his constitutional obligation to uphold the rule of law, if he knows who is stealing and he does nothing about it. It's yet another manifestation of his complete lack of insight into the duties and responsibilities of a president in our constitutional democracy' (Olifant 2016a: 4). Lastly, under the heading 'Zuma a distraction for the real problem', the following summarizes the relationship between the ANC and president as follows: The ANC 'have clearly indicated when they voted against the motion that they stand for corruption, money laundering, state capture. They have nothing to do with the well-being of ordinary South African citizen, in fact they are the biggest benefactors in the Zuma administration, they are clearly ensuring that the president stay in power so that they can proceed to looting the country under his nose' (*MyNews24* 2016). It is important to remember that although 'white monopoly capital', whether concentrated in banks, SOEs, or the National Treasury, it remains the target of Zuma-fication – the State of Capture Report made this available in the public domain for all to study.

As far back as 1966, and by resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations deemed apartheid a crime against humanity. Today, 50 years later, *there is no reason why fraud and corruption cannot also be treated as crimes against humanity.* In other words, we concur with Azeez when he concluded: 'Corruption is murder and deliberate extermination of civilian populations; it is *hostis humani generis* (enemy of mankind) and must be treated as such' (2015: 20). It would go a long way to eradicate the practise of Zuma-fication, and similar to that of apartheid, its legacy will and cannot be wiped from South African history in the near future.

Meanwhile on 26 November 2016, Tourism Minister, Derek Hanekom 'stunned Zuma and his backers when he tabled a motion to step down at the national executive committee (NEC) meeting yesterday' (Nhlabathi *et al.*, 2016).

----------References

Adorno, T. and M. Horkheimer. 2011. *Towards a New Manifesto*. (Translated by R. Livingstone.) Verso, London and New York.

Azeez, A. 2015. 'Corruption as a Crime Against Humanity: Any Justification?' (Paper presented at The International Conference on Governance and Service Delivery in Developing Economies, organized by Uganda Management Institute at Imperial Royale Hotel, 25th - 28th August 2015), Kampala. https://www.academia.edu/15725750/CORRUPTION_AS_A_CRIME_AGAINST_

HUMANITY_ANY_JUSTIFICATION. [Accessed on 15 November 2016.]

Boraine, A. 2014. *What's Gone Wrong? On the Brink of a Failed State.* Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Bottomore, T. 1984. *The Frankfurt School*. Ellis Horwood Limited Publishers, Chichester, and Tavistock Publications, London and New York.

Carolus, C. 'Zuma has brought shame on the ANC', in *News24*. m.news24.com/news24. [Accessed on 5 November 2016.]

Coetzee, J. 2014. 'President Zuma Believes Charges Should be Dropped as Corruption a White Thing'. http://www.europeanknightsproject.com/zuma-believes-charges-dropped-corruption-white-thing/ [Accessed on 6 November 2016.]

Darwin, C. 1976. *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.* Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.

Engelbrecht, C. 2012. 'Limitations in History. Part II. Theory and Eastern Cape Historical Research'. http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp.1–12. [Accessed on 6 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2013a. 'The Politicking of Space and a Local Museum.' http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp.1–16. [Accessed on 21 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2013b. 'Early Critical Theory, Racket Theory, and the Arms Deal for South Africa'. http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp.1–19. [Accessed on 6 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2013c. 'The Kowie History Museum and Historical Research'. http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp.1–8. [Accessed on 21 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2013d. 'Traditional and Critical Theory – Any Relevance For Aspects of Eastern Cape (South Africa) History?' http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp1-14. [Accessed on 27 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2014a. 'Globalization Theory and Reference to Aspects of Eastern Cape (South Africa) History.' http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, 1–15. [Accessed on 21 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2014b. 'Max Horkheimer's Concept of "Suffering."' http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp.1–22. [Accessed on 23 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2014c. 'Max Horkheimer's Problems with Science, Technology and Hope.' http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, pp.1-17. [Accessed on 23 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2014d. '*Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Contemporary South African History'. http://independent.academia.edu.christoengelbrecht/papers, [Accessed on 6 November 2016.]

Engelbrecht, C. 2015. 'Max Horkheimer's Early Views of the German Working Class.' https://www.academia.edu/12990101/Max_Horkheimers_Early_Views_of_the_German_ Working_ Class, 1–62. [Accessed on 23 November 2016.]

Feinstein, A. 2007. *After the Party.* (Reprint.) Jonathan Ball Publishers (PTY) LTD., Jeppestown.

Gqirana, T. 2016a. 'How can we trust Mahlobo? – R2K'. *News24.News24*. 18 November 2016. [Accessed 19 November 2016.]

Gqirana, T. 2016b. 'Keep talking state capture. It's your right – EFF tell Madonsela.' *News24/News24*, 11 November. [Accessed on 12 November 2016.]

Habermas, J. 1974. *Theory and Practice*. (Translated by J. Viertel.) Beacon Press, Boston.

Herman, P. 2016. 'Union calls for Zuma to resign are ''strange'' – ANC'. *News24/News24*, 19 November. [Accessed on 19 November 2016.]

Horkheimer, M. 1972. *Critical Theory. Selected Essays*. (Translated by M.J. O'Connell and others.) A Continuum Book. The Seabury Press, New York.

Horkheimer, M. 1978. *Dawn and Decline. Notes 1926-1931 and 1950-1969.* (Translated by M. Shaw, with an Afterword by E. Gebhardt.) A Continuum Book, The Seabury Press, New York.

Horkheimer, M. 1993. *Between Philosophy and Social Science. Early Selected Writings.* (Translated by G.F. Hunter, M.S. Kramer and J. Torpey.) The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England.

Horkheimer, M. 2004. *Eclipse of Reason*. Continuum, London and New York.

Horkheimer, M. 2007. *A Life in Letters.* 2007. (Edited, translated, and with an Introduction by M.R. Jacobson and E.M. Jacobson.) University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London.

Horkheimer, M. and T.W. Adorno. 2002. *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments*. (Edited by G.S. Noerr and translated by E. Jephcott.) Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.

Khoza, A. 2015. 'Investing in ANC a wise move – Zuma'. News24. 9 October. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Investing-in-ANC-a-wise-move-Zuma-20151009. [Accessed 0n 24 November 2016.]

Khoza, A. 2016. 'President Zuma: "I never thought ANC cadres would hate each other', *eHowzit South Coast*, 19 November. http://www.ehowzit.co.za/news/south- africa/president-zuma-i-never-thought-anc-cadres-would-hate-each-other/ [Accessed on 19 November 2016.]

Kriegler, J. 2016. 'Shaun, jy kan jou nog red …', in *Rapport Weekliks*, 30 October, p.11.

Lebone, K. 2016. 'State capture is here to stay' in *News24*, 10 November. [Accessed on 1 November 2016.]

Lobkowicz, N. 1967. *Theory and Practice. History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx.* University

of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London.

Madibogo, J. 2016. 'I am not scared of jail – Zuma.' *Times Live*. 5 November. http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/11/05/I-am-not-scared-of-jail---Zuma. [Accessed on 20 November 2016.]

Madonsela, T.N. 2016. *State of Capture Report* (No: 6 of 2016/17). *Report on an investigation into alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other state functionaries relating into alleged and improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family's*. 14 October. Public Protector of South Africa, Pretoria.

Makhlanya, M. 2016. 'Humanity goes into rewind.' *News24* (in conjunction with *City Press*). m.news24.com/news24/Columnists/Mondi-humanity-goes-into-rewind-20161125. 25 November. [Accessed on 27 November 2016.]

Makinana, A., S. Stone and H. Nhlabathi. 2016. 'Zuma tells MPs to vote against motion, or else', in *News24* (in partnership with *City Press*), 13 November. m.nes24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-tells-mps-to-vote-against-motion-or-else-20161112. [Accessed on 13 November 2016.]

Mc Lennan, A. and B. Munslow. (eds.) 2009. *The Politics of Service Delivery.* Wits University Press, Johannesburg.

Marx, K. and F. Engels. 2002. *The Communist Manifesto*. (With an Introduction by G.S. Jones.) Penguin Books, London.

Masondo, S. 2016. 'Constitutional Court's damning judgment: Zuma violated his oath of office', in *News24.com.* 31 March. http://city-press.news24.com/News/constitutional-courts-damning-judgment-zuma-violated-his-oath-of-office-20160331 [Accessed on 11 November 2016.]

MyNews24. 2016. 'Zuma a distraction for the real problem'. 11 November. [Accessed on 12 November 2016.]

News24. 2016a. 'Dear President Zuma: We are exhausted'. 11 November. [Accessed on 11 November 2016.]

News24. 2016b. ''Erect a Statue for Jacob Zuma'. 14 November. [Accessed on 19 November 2016.]

Nhlabathi, H. 2016. 'SACP mulls Divorce', in *News24 City Press*. 6 November. [Accessed on 6 November 2016.]

Nhlabathi, H., S. Cele, S. Stone and A. Makinana. 2016. 'Zuma's ANC leadership left hanging by a thread' m.news24.com/news24/South Africa/News/anc-turnsoonzuma-20161126. 27 November. [Accessed on 27 November 2016.]

Olifant, N. 2016a. 'Defiant Zuma fires salvo at his critics and tell them he'll be around for "better or worse"'. *Sunday Times*, 20 November.

Olifant, N. 2016b. 'I am watching the real thieves, says Zuma'. *Sunday Times*. 20 Nobember.

_____

www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2016/11/20. [Accessed on 24 November 2016.]

Popper, K. 2008. *The Open Society and Its Enemies.* Volume Two. *Hegel and Marx.* Routledge and Kegan Paul, Oxon and New York.

Quintall, G. 2015. 'The ANC comes first, not the country'. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/the-anc-comes-first-not-the-country-zuma-20151108. 11 November. [Accessed on 24 November 2016.]

Ramaphosa, C. 2016. 'Act on corruption without delay'. Speech at Limpopo Economic Summit in Polokwane on 5 November 2016. *News24.* m.news24.com.news 24. [Accessed on 5 November 2016.]

Sapa. 2014. 'Zuma puts party above country – DA.' 23 January. http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/115603/zuma-puts-party-country-da/. [Accessed on 24 November 2016.]

Southall, R. 2016. 'Troubled History: Nelson Mandela's ANC may have brought freedom to South Africa, but is sowed the seeds for corruption'. *Quartz Africa.* 7 September. gz.com/775317/how-ancs-path-to-corruption-was-set-in-south-africas-1994-transition-under-nelson-mandela/. [Accessed on 21 November 2016.]

Stone, J. 2016a. 'It Looks Like Those "Clever Blacks" Came Back to Haunt Zuma'. 8 August. http://www.2oceansvibe.com/2016/08/08/it-looks-like-those-clever-blacks-came-back-to-haunt-zuma/. [Accessed on 9 August 2016.]

Stone, A. 2016b. 'State capture investigation: 'Kill Zuma's deal'' *News24* (in partnership with *City Press.* 13 November. [Accessed on 13 November 2016.]

Tankwa, L. 2016a. 'President Zuma compares himself to Jesus', m.news24.com/news24. 19 November. [Accessed on 20 November 2016.]

Tankwa, L. 2016b. 'Outspoken ANC members must be careful of their own skeletons – Zuma'. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/outspoken-anc-members-must-be-careful-of-their-own-skeletons-zuma-20161119. 19 November 2016. [Accessed on 23 November 2016.]

Tankwa, L. 2016c. 'State capture better hidden under Nelson Mandela, - R2K'. *News24.* www.news24.com/.../state-capture-better-hidden-under-mandela-mbeki-r2k-2016112 23. 22 November. [Accessed on 23 November 2016.]

The Star. 2006. *Edition 4.* 'An overall corrupt relationship'. https://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/An+overall+corrupt+relationship,+Political+Bureau,+The+Star. 14 November. [Accessed on 11 November 2016.]

Van Onselen, G. 2014. Clever Blacks, Jesus and Nkandla. The Real Jacob Zuma in His Own Words. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Zuma, J.K. 2014. 'The ANC will rule till Jesus comes back', in *Mail & Guardian* 8 January.

Zuma, J.K. 2016. 'I'm not afraid of jail', in *Reuters Top News.* 5 November. mobile.reuters.com/article/i [Accessed on 6 November 2016.]

_____